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CASE COMMENT 
653 
Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens: The Fourth 
Circuit Adopts the “Strikingly Similar” 
Doctrine to Infer Proof of Access 
Douglas Raymond Arntsen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Copyright protection has evolved considerably from its British 
origin as a suppressive statute divesting control of the printing 
presses to only a few private publishers.1  The empowerment of 
these “Stationers” to establish regulations concerning the 
publication of written material was changed through the passage of 
the Statute of Anne in 1710.2  This statute, termed an “anti-
censorship trade regulation statute,”3 devolved copyright power, 
granting individual authors copyright protection to effectuate the 
encouragement of public learning.4  The encouragement of public 
learning was also the principle the framers of the U.S. Constitution 
 
* Associate, Buchanan Ingersoll Professional Corporation in New York, N.Y.  B.S., 
magna cum laude, St. John’s University, 1999; J.D., Seton Hall University School of 
Law, 2002; LL.M. expected, Fordham University School of Law, 2004.  The views 
expressed herein are strictly those of the author.  The author would like to thank Sean P. 
Campbell and Patrick S. Brannigan for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of this 
Case Comment. Email: arntsendr@bipc.com. 
1 See Robin D. Gross & Katina Bishop, An “Odd Bird”—A Case for Balance in 
Copyright Law in Cyberspace, Electronic Frontier Foundation, at http://www.eff.org/ 
cafe/oddbird.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2003). 
2 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). See also Gross & Bishop, supra note 1. 
3 Gross & Bishop, supra note 1. 
4 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (covering an “act for the encouragement of 
learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the author’s [sic] or purchasers of such 
copies . . .”). See also L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF 
COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 27–29 (1991). 
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desired to implement in the initial creation of American copyright 
protection.5 
In the United States, the “Copyright Clause” of the 
Constitution establishes copyright protection.6  Current copyright 
law in the United States is based on the Copyright Act of 1976.7  
Under this act, a copyright exists in “original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”8 
In order to obtain copyright protection, the proposed work must 
be a “fixed” and “original” work.9  The term “original” in this 
context dictates that a composition must be independently created 
and not copied from another work.10  Since “original” is not 
interpreted to mean unique or novel, highly similar works can be 
protected so long as they are not duplicates of one another.11  
Fixation occurs when a work is made “sufficiently permanent or 
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”12 
Copyrightable works include “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works.”13  Once such a work is granted copyright protection, the 
copyright in the work of authorship instantaneously converts into 
the property of the creator who produced the work.14 
 
5 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The underlying rationale of the copyright regime is 
to enable Congress to enact laws necessary to “Promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.” Id. 
6 See id. 
7 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–803 (2000)). 
8 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
9 See id. 
10 See id; PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 4, at 96–97. 
11 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It would 
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves 
final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”); 
Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984). 
12 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “fixed”).  In essence, as soon as an original work is 
created, it is copyrighted. 
13 Id. § 102(a). 
14 See Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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Only the author or those deriving their rights through the 
author can rightfully claim copyright protection, and such 
protection continues for the life of the author plus seventy years.15  
Federal law provides protection by shielding copyright owners 
from the unlawful reproduction, performance, adaptation, 
distribution, or display of copyright protected compositions as such 
usage constitutes infringement.16 
Although registration is not necessary for copyright protection, 
there are several advantages designed to persuade authors to 
register.17  Registration verifies the copyright entitlement in the 
public record, and thereafter works may be eligible for statutory 
damages and attorney’s fees in successful litigation.18  If 
registration is completed before or within five years of publication, 
registration will provide prima facie evidence in court of the 
validity of the copyright and of the facts declared in the 
certificate.19 
Although copyright attaches upon fixation, one cannot actually 
file suit against an alleged infringer until the work has been 
registered with the U.S. Copyright Office.20  If the work is 
registered within three months from the date of first publication, or 
at least prior to the date of the alleged infringement, statutory 
damages can be collected from the infringer.21  Otherwise, actual 
damages may be the only avenue of reparation.22  For works 
created on or after March 1, 1989, the © symbol is used to 
 
15 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 on Duration of Subsisting 
Copyrights, Pub. L. No. 105-298 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301–304); 
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
349 (2d ed. 2000). 
16 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 109(a); MERGES ET AL., supra note 15, at 432–83.  A copyright 
owner has the following exclusive rights: (1) the right to make copies; (2) the right to 
prepare derivative works; (3) the right to distribute original and/or copies of the 
copyrighted work; and (4) the right to perform or display the copyrighted work publicly. 
Id. at 432. 
17 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 
18 See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 898–99 (7th Cir. 1984). 
19 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). See also U.S. Copyright Off., Copyright Basics, 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1.html (Sept. 2000). 
20 See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 
21 See id. § 412. 
22 See id. 
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designate copyright protection,23 and allows the owner to receive 
damages24 and avert innocent infringement defenses.25  Generally, 
civil remedies are available to the copyright owner for any act of 
infringement.26  The plaintiff (copyright owner) can immediately 
seek an injunction to halt the alleged infringement, 27 and, if 
successful, can recover his or her actual damages plus the 
infringer’s profits  or statutory damages.28 
To prevail in a copyright infringement action, a plaintiff must 
first exhibit ownership of a valid copyright.29  Secondly, the 
plaintiff must proffer evidence that the defendant copied the 
plaintiff’s work.30  This may be demonstrated through inference or 
proof of substantial similarity between the original work and the 
alleged infringer’s compilation, in combination with evidence that 
the defendant had access to the work.31  The requirements for 
substantial similarity and proof of access are inversely 
proportional.32  As the degree of similarity increases, the need to 
show proof of access decreases.33  In instances of “striking 
similarity,” access generally will be inferred absent proof to the 
contrary.34  Conversely, if direct proof of access is established, less 
similarity will be needed to prove infringement.35 
Since direct evidence of copying is rarely available to a 
plaintiff in a copyright infringement action, circumstantial 
evidence has been granted judicial acceptance as creating a 
 
23 See id. § 401(b)(1). 
24 See id. § 504. 
25 See id. § 401(d).  An innocent infringer is one who infringes on a copyright 
unknowingly, i.e., without notice. MERGES ET AL., supra note 15, at 369. 
26 See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).  In contrast, criminal remedies are available only for limited 
types of infringing acts. See id. § 506(a); MERGES ET AL., supra note 15, at 548–56. 
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). 
28 See id. § 504. 
29 See id. § 410(c). See also generally id. §§ 101–102; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 
Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
30 See Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1984). 
31 See id. at 901–02. 
32 See Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
35 See id. 
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presumption of copying.36  To establish this presumption, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the works are substantially similar 
and that there was a reasonable possibility that the alleged infringer 
had access to the plaintiff’s work.37  Access has been characterized 
as the opportunity to view a copyrighted work.38  A plaintiff may 
prove that there was a reasonable possibility of access through 
circumstantial evidence.39 
BOUCHAT  V. BALTIMORE RAVENS, INC. 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Frederick E. Bouchat is an amateur artist, whose formal 
education ended in the ninth grade.  He worked as a security guard 
at the front entrance of the Department of Labor, Licensing and 
Regulation, in downtown Baltimore.40  Bouchat spent much of his 
spare time drawing and painting, and he often displayed his 
artwork to people as they entered and exited the State of Maryland 
office building on St. Paul Street.41  In the fall of 1995, Bouchat 
learned of the Cleveland Browns’ relocation to Baltimore.42  In late 
November 1995, Bouchat designed a logo for Baltimore’s new 
football team using portions of the Maryland state flag and a 
raven.43  Bouchat affixed this design to a miniature football helmet, 
which he presented to Eugene A. Conti, Jr., who was then the 
 
36 See Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 581–83 (4th Cir. 1996); Keeler Brass Co. v. 
Cont’l Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1065 (4th Cir. 1988). 
37 See Towler, 76 F.3d at 581–82. 
38 Ferguson v. NBC, Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Towler, 76 F.3d 
at 582–83 (holding a reasonable possibility of access exists if it was reasonably possible 
that “the paths of the infringer and the infringed work crossed” or that the infringer had a 
reasonable opportunity to view it). 
39 Ferguson, 584 F.2d at 113. See also Towler, 76 F.3d at 582–83. 
40 Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 352 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 532 
U.S. 1038 (2001). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. See also Cleveland Browns, Wikipedia, at http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Cleveland_Browns (last visited Mar. 25, 2003). 
43 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 352. See also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Bouchat, 241 
F.3d at 350, http://www.whitecase.com/case_ravens_petition_writ.pdf. 
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Secretary of the Department of Licensing and Regulation.44  Even 
before the new football team was officially named, Bouchat’s 
drawings showed that he wanted to name the team the Ravens, as a 
tribute to the late Baltimore local Edgar Allen Poe.45  In December 
1995, Bouchat gave away copies of his shield drawings as 
presents.46 
On March 28, 1996, Conti arranged a meeting between 
Bouchat and John Moag, then chairman of the Maryland Stadium 
Authority (MSA).47  Conti intended the meeting to procure an 
editorial about Bouchat and his sketches in the upcoming MSA 
employee newsletter.48  At that conference, Bouchat was informed 
that the new team would indeed be named the Baltimore Ravens.49  
Moag offered Bouchat the MSA’s fax number and instructed him 
to forward his logo sketches, which might then be relayed to team 
officials whose transition offices were in the same building.50  
Bouchat faxed his illustrations on April 1 or 2, but failed to retain a 
printed confirmation receipt of the transmission.51  While the 
miniature helmet did not feature the eventual Baltimore Ravens’ 
disputed logo, Bouchat claimed that Moag requested that all other 
designs be faxed to Moag’s MSA office.52  One of the drawings 
Bouchat sent to Moag was his shield drawing.53  A day later, the 
team’s owner, David Modell, convened with the NFL Properties 
design director to discuss the progress of a Ravens logo.54  In June 
1996, when the Baltimore Ravens revealed their logos to the 
public, the design was quite familiar to Bouchat and his 
acquaintances.55  Bouchat contended that he faxed the same 
 
44 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 352. 







52 Id. at 352–53. 
53 Id. at 353. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. See also Darren Rovell, Supreme Court’s Pass Is Ravens’ Loss on Logo Appeal, 
ESPN, at http://www.espn.go.com/nfl/s/2001/0521/1202578.html (May 21, 2001) (“‘It 
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design, a logo depicting a winged shield displaying a large B, the 
word “Ravens,” and a cross, to the MSA in early April.56  
Although the MSA shared the same Pratt Street office with 
Baltimore Ravens’ team owner David Modell at the time that 
Bouchat asserts his drawings were viewed and copied, stadium 
authorities and Ravens officials denied receiving the drawings or 
copying them.57  The Ravens contended that league artists at NFL 
Properties in New York created the design without any 
participation from Bouchat.58 
In August 1996, Bouchat enlisted the services of Howard J. 
Schulman, of Schulman & Kaufman, L.L.C., to acquire a copyright 
registration for his shield drawing.59  Thereafter, in May 1997, 
Bouchat filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland accusing the Baltimore Ravens and NFL 
Properties, Inc., of copyright infringement.60  While Baltimore 
Ravens executives contended that artists at NFL Properties 
designed the logo, the team’s logo utilized a design nearly identical 
to Bouchat’s.61  In November 1998, a jury returned a verdict in 
favor of Bouchat as to his shield drawing.62  Afterwards, the 
Ravens moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or 
alternatively for a new trial, contending that Bouchat failed to 
prove that the Ravens had access to Bouchat’s drawings.63 
In an opinion dated February 19, 1999, United States District 
Judge Marvin J. Garbis denied the defendant’s motion, concluding 
that the jury’s November verdict was “supported by adequate 
evidence.”64  Furthermore, Judge Garbis rejected the defense 
 
was on television because they unveiled it on the side of a building at the Orioles game,’ 
Bouchat said.  ‘It was so huge and I was so excited.’”). 
56 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 353. 
57 Id. at 353, 361. 
58 Id. at 353. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 350, 353. 
61 Id. at 354. See also Ravens Logo Lawsuit in Hands of Jury, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.),  
Oct. 29, 1998, at http://www.augustasports.com/stories/102998/pro_124-6468.shtml. 
62 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 352. 
63 Id. 
64 James Franklin, A Federal Judge Has Upheld a Jury’s Verdict, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 
22, 1999, available at 1999 WL 12932437. See also Dave McKenna, Logo á No-Go, 
WASH. CITY PAPER (D.C.), Jan. 12, 2001, http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/ 
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lawyers’ assertion that one juror had been coerced by a deadlocked 
panel into deciding in favor of Bouchat.65  Because the trial was 
bifurcated, and a completely separate trial before another federal 
jury would be held to assess the penalty that the infringers would 
pay, no damages were awarded.66  Under the ruling, Bouchat 
would return for a new hearing in the United States district court in 
Baltimore to ascertain whether he would receive a percentage of 
the Ravens’ profits from merchandise bearing the disputed shield 
logo, or some other measure of damages.67 
The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal and the district 
court certified four questions for interlocutory appeal to the Fourth 
Circuit.68  First, the lower court inquired into whether Bouchat’s 
evidence of a reasonable possibility of access to his drawing by the 
Ravens and NFL Properties was insufficient to justify the finding 
of copyright infringement.69  Second, if Bouchat’s evidence was 
insufficient, the lower court questioned whether the Fourth Circuit 
would adopt the “strikingly similar” doctrine inferring access.70  
Third, the district court questioned whether Bouchat’s failure to 
note the derivative nature of his drawing on his copyright 
 
archives/cheap/2001/cheap0112.html.  After the jury decided in Bouchat’s favor, the 
team replaced the helmet logo and abandoned the utilization of the disputed logo. See id. 
The Ravens, because of the trial loss, stopped using the shield on their helmets 
prior to the 1999 season. The replacement design, a manic bird mocked even by 
some home fans as the “Heckle and Jeckle” logo, makes for what is widely 
regarded as the ugliest headgear in the league. 
Id.  Of the 18,708 who voted, 7,107 chose in a two day poll conducted by the Baltimore 
Sun, a profile logo over a straight-on look of a Raven’s head and a shield featuring 
elements of the Maryland state flag with the initials B and R. See id. 
65 Franklin, supra note 64. 
66 See Tiffany Wlazlowski, What’s to Be Done with the Highway Signs? That’s the 
Question Facing the Baltimore Ravens, DAILY RECORD (Balt.), Mar. 24, 1999, at 3A.  On 
July 24, 2002, a jury, assessing the issue of damages, awarded zero damages to Bouchat.  
Bouchat’s attorney stated that he is contemplating appealing the decision. See Laurie 
Willis, Nothing Owed in Ravens Lawsuit: Logo Artist Didn’t Deserve Compensation, 
Jurors Rule, BALT. SUN, July 25, 2002, at 1B.  However, in Baltimore Ravens, Inc. v. 
Bouchat, 532 U.S. 1038 (2001), the Supreme Court denied certiorari.  
67 See Jay Apperson, Ravens Lose Appeal of Logo Ruling, BALT. SUN, Oct. 4, 2000, at 
1B. 
68 Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 353 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 532 
U.S. 1038 (2001). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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application necessitated the dismissal of his copyright infringement 
claim.71  Finally, the lower court asked whether the jury had been 
improperly coerced to reach its verdict.72 
On October 3, 2000, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s refusal to overturn the jury verdict in favor of Bouchat.73  
The defendants appealed the Fourth Circuit’s ruling before the 
penalty phase began, but on May 21, 2001, the United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.74 
B. Opinion of the Fourth Circuit 
On October 3, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit answered the certified questions posed by the 
district court and ruled in favor of Bouchat.75  In a two-to-one 
decision, authored by U.S. District Court Judge James H. Michael, 
Jr., of the Western District of Virginia,76 and joined by Circuit 
Judge H. Emory Widener, the appellate panel upheld the original 
federal jury verdict that the Baltimore Ravens had infringed on 
several of Bouchat’s copyrights when developing the “shield logo” 
for their new National Football League team.77 
The Fourth Circuit ruled that Bouchat was entitled to the lower 
court’s adoption of the “strikingly similar” doctrine, which created 
a presumption that the defendants had access to the plaintiff’s 
work.78  The court also upheld the lower court’s holding, citing its 
findings that David Modell (or his intermediary) had the 
 
71 Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as 
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, 
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, 
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation or any other form 
in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.  A work consisting of 
editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a 
whole represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.” 
Id.  For a derivative work to be copyrightable, it must be sufficiently dissimilar from the 
original work so that it can be deemed a new work in its own right. Id. 
72 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 353. 
73 Id. at 352. 
74 Bouchat, 532 U.S. 1038 (2001). 
75 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 352. 
76 Judge Michael sat on the Fourth Circuit by special designation. Id. 
77 Id. at 354. 
78 Id. at 354–55. See also Ferguson v. NBC, Inc., 584 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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opportunity to view the work and that the subsequent material 
produced was considerably similar to Bouchat’s work.79  Taken 
together, these facts were sufficient to establish copyright 
infringement under the presumption of defendants’ access.80 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling by U.S. District Judge 
Marvin J. Garbis, of the District of Maryland, denying a motion by 
the Ravens and NFL Properties for judgment notwithstanding the 
jury verdict.81  The appellate panel ruled that Bouchat had not 
invalidated his copyright protection by incorporating public 
domain elements in his drawing, or by failing to indicate the 
derivative nature of his authorship on his copyright application.82  
They held that Bouchat’s accidental but harmless mistake in his 
copyright application did not subsequently preclude an 
infringement action against defendants.83  Judge Michael 
emphasized that Bouchat clearly presented sufficient evidence to 
sustain his burden of showing that the defendants had access to the 
copyrighted drawings and that there was enough similarity 
between Bouchat’s drawing and the Ravens’ logo for the jury to 
conclude that the defendants copied Bouchat’s work.84 
Judge Michael began the opinion by assessing whether 
Bouchat had proved that the NFL’s designers and artists had access 
to the drawings.85  To succeed in his copyright infringement case, 
the appellate court maintained that Bouchat needed to prove that 
the Ravens and league officials had access to the work by showing 
 
79 See Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 356–57; U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 19. 
80 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 357. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 354. 
Defendants admit that Modell and other Ravens staff shared office space with 
Moag . . . and that Modell’s own office was within “earshot” of Moag’s office.  
By proving that the drawings were transmitted to Moag, and that Modell shared 
the same office space with Moag, Bouchat proved that Modell had “access” to 
Bouchat’s drawing. 
Id. 
83 Id. at 356. 
84 Id. at 353–54 (citing Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Feist 
Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991))). 
85 Id. at 354 (quoting Meta-Film Assocs. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1355 (C.D. 
Cal. 1984)). In Meta-Film, the plaintiff filed suit for copyright infringement, alleging that 
the defendants’ movie and TV series were derived from the plaintiff’s unpublished 
screenplay. Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1349. 
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that they had an opportunity to view the work.86  Judge Michael 
explained that where direct evidence of copying is lacking, a 
plaintiff can establish copying using circumstantial evidence that 
the alleged infringer had access to the original work and that the 
infringer’s work is substantially similar to the author’s original 
work.87 
The Baltimore Ravens argued that as the defendants denied 
ever receiving Bouchat’s faxed drawings, Bouchat’s evidence was 
merely a “tortuous chain of hypothetical transmittals” that failed to 
meet the necessary standard to prove access.88  The Ravens 
contended that the design was created independently by league 
artists at NFL Properties and Bouchat had stolen the logo from the 
team.89  However, the appellate court did not find the Ravens’ 
contentions to be convincing and upheld the jury’s findings that 
Modell had verified access to Bouchat’s sketches and that the 
chain from Bouchat to NFL Property’s designers was not so 
hypothetical as to preclude copyright infringement.90 
Judge Michael held that Bouchat was not required to prove that 
Modell in fact saw the drawings and copied them, but rather that 
he only had to establish that Modell or his intermediaries had 
access to the drawings.91  Judge Michael found Bouchat’s 
proffered evidence to be dispositive, noting that the jury was 
permitted to accept Bouchat’s evidence that his logo facsimile was 
transmitted to Moag, who shared an office with Modell at the time, 
and that Moag offered to forward his drawings to the Baltimore 
Ravens.92 
 
86 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 354.  Ravens Spokesman Kevin Byrne stated, “The Ravens had 
no knowledge of Mr. Bouchat or his artwork prior to our approval of the NFL Properties 
design.” Gail Gibson, Supreme Court Won’t Review Case Against Ravens Logo, BALT. 
SUN, May 22, 2001, at 8B. 
87 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 353–54 (citing Towler, 76 F.3d at 581–82). 
88 Id. at 354 (quoting Meta-Film, 586 F. Supp. at 1355). 
89 Id. See also Gibson, supra note 86; Rovell, supra note 55. 
90 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 353. 
91 Id. at 354 (Since “Modell had access to the drawings, the jury was able to combine 
that conclusion with the substantial similarity between the Ravens’ logo and Bouchat’s 
drawing to find, ultimately, that the Ravens copied Bouchat’s copyrighted work.”). 
92 Id. 
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Judge Michael also found that evidence of the fax procedures 
followed by the MSA and Moag’s law firm indicated that the MSA 
had likely forwarded Bouchat’s fax to Moag at his law firm and 
that Modell probably examined Bouchat’s logo design there, as 
Modell and other Ravens staff shared office space “within earshot” 
of Moag’s office.93  Although Bouchat failed to prove that Modell 
actually viewed Bouchat’s drawings, the Fourth Circuit maintained 
that Bouchat was only required to prove that Modell had access to 
the drawings by showing that Modell had the opportunity to view 
them.94  By demonstrating that the drawings were transmitted to 
Moag and that Modell shared the same office space with Moag, the 
majority found that Bouchat sufficiently established  Modell’s 
“access” to Bouchat’s drawing to maintain a copyright 
infringement action.95  The majority stated that once the jury 
concluded that Modell had access to the drawings, the jury was 
able to link that conclusion with the evidence of substantial 
similarity to find that the Ravens copied Bouchat’s work.96  Judge 
Michael noted that the district court speculated that the fax might 
even have been accidentally delivered to Modell since his name 
appeared on the fax, but that Bouchat’s evidence was sufficient to 
demonstrate access without such conjecture.97  Furthermore, the 
majority confirmed that the jury was entitled to infer that the NFL 
designers had access since Modell, a third-party intermediary with 
a close relationship to the designers, had access.98 
Although the appellate court ruled that the federal jury’s 
finding of access had been supported by evidence, Judge Michael 
then considered the second certified question: whether to adopt the 
“striking similarity” doctrine.99  In choosing to adopt the doctrine, 
Judge Michael found that the inference of access is justified where 
 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 355. 
95 Id. at 354. 
96 Id. at 355–56 (citing Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988)). In Gaste, 
defendants appealed a ruling in favor of plaintiffs, the composers of an obscure French 
song composed nearly seventeen years before the defendants had arranged and published 
the popular song “Feelings.” Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1061.  A jury found the defendants liable 
for copyright infringement and awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. 
97 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 354. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. (citing Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1068). 
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the two works are “so similar as to create a high probability of 
copying that negates the reasonable possibility of independent 
creation.”100  Judge Michael noted that the Fifth Circuit has gone 
so far as to find copying by a showing of striking similarity that 
“precludes the possibility of independent creation.”101  The Fourth 
Circuit held, however, that striking similarity between the 
copyrighted and subsequent work constitutes circumstantial 
evidence of copying, only supporting an inference of access, which 
must still be shown.102 
In the earlier case of Towler v. Sayles, the Fourth Circuit held 
that in a copyright infringement action, a plaintiff could establish a 
presumption of copying by showing that the defendant had access 
to her original composition and that the two compositions in 
question were substantially similar.103  The Towler court concluded 
that even if access were to be inferred for purposes of proving 
infringement, the plaintiff must also establish that the allegedly 
infringing work is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s work.104  
In Ferguson v. NBC, however, the Fifth Circuit held that absent 
proof of access, a plaintiff can still prevail if she establishes that 
the two works were not just substantially similar, but were so 
strikingly similar as to exclude the possibility of independent 
creation.105  Thus, the Ferguson court eliminated the prerequisite 
 
100 Id. at 355–56. 
101 Id. at 356 (citing Ferguson v. NBC, Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
102 Id. at 355. 
103 Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 582 (4th Cir. 1996). 
104 Id. at 583. 
105 584 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1978).  In Ferguson, Appellant submitted copies of her 
unpublished work to six persons in the publishing industry who had no interest in 
publishing her work and returned the composition to Appellant.  Appellant then alleged 
that Appellee infringed her copyright by utilizing the last eight and first sixteen measures 
of her composition in the theme tune of a television program aired by Appellee.  
Appellant also filed suit against the theme song composer but the court dismissed the 
action.  The appellate court affirmed.  The court held that when there is slight direct 
evidence of copying, the plaintiff normally proves this aspect by showing that the person 
who created the defendant’s work had access to the copyrighted material. Id. 
 Appellant failed to prove that the theme composer had access to Appellant’s work; 
there was also not proof of a substantial similarity between Appellant’s composition and 
the theme song.  Appellee offered evidence that the songs were not substantially similar.  
Once Appellee presented evidence supporting its motion for summary judgment, 
Appellant was obliged to submit considerable probative evidence to refute Appellee’s 
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of establishing the element of access (by inferring access due to 
similarity).106  The Fifth Circuit held that striking similarity may be 
sufficient to prove copying, even where there is no showing of 
access.  Unlike the Fifth Circuit, Judge Michael asserted that the 
Fourth Circuit does not favor the “wholesale abandonment of the 
access requirement in the face of striking similarity.”107  Rather, 
like the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Fourth Circuit 
recognized that striking similarity is simply one way to infer 
access.108  The Second and Seventh Circuits infer access when two 
works are so similar as to make it highly probable that copying was 
involved, thereby negating the “reasonable possibility of 
independent creation.”109 
In Bouchat, the Fourth Circuit adopted this doctrine and 
declined to emulate the Fifth Circuit, holding that access remains 
an indispensable part of a copyright infringement claim, and 
striking similarity is but one way to demonstrate access.110  Judge 
Michael noted that the striking similarity between the works did 
not in itself dispense with the requirement of proof of access by 
Modell, but that such similarity “was a proper factor for the jury to 
consider” in its determination of whether Bouchat had proved 
copying.111  The appellate court reasoned that Bouchat could use 
 
evidence, which Appellant failed to do.  The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, 
finding summary judgment for Appellee was appropriate because Appellant failed to 
verify that Appellee had access to Appellant’s song and fell short in establishing a 
substantial similarity between the two works. Id. 
106 Id.  See also Towler, 76 F.3d at 583–84. 
Proving substantial similarity requires a two-part analysis.  First, a plaintiff 
must show, typically with the aid of expert testimony, that the works in 
question are extrinsically similar because they contain substantially similar 
ideas that are subject to copyright protection.  Second, a plaintiff must satisfy 
the subjective, or intrinsic, portion of the test by showing the substantial 
similarity in how those ideas are expressed. 
Id. 
107 Towler, 76 F.3d at 584. 
108 See id. (citing Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1988) and Selle v. 
Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
109 See id. (citing Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir. 
1997)).  In Ty, the appellant subsequent manufacturer’s bean-bag pig was strikingly 
similar to the original manufacturer’s pig. See Ty, 132 F.3d at 1170. 
110 See Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 356 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 
532 U.S. 1038 (2001). 
111 See id. 
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circumstantial evidence to prove copying because Modell had the 
opportunity to receive the faxed drawing since he shared office 
space with Moag.112 
The Fourth Circuit next addressed the third certified question 
from the district court and held that the copyright infringement 
claim should not be discarded based on alleged imperfections in 
the plaintiff’s copyright application.113  The majority rejected the 
defense’s argument and found that Bouchat’s drawing was entitled 
to copyright protection.114  The Fourth Circuit concurred that 
Bouchat failed to state on his copyright application that certain 
elements of his design were in the public domain, but noted that 
Bouchat’s error was neither deceitful nor deliberate.115  Judge 
Michael determined that unintentional, harmless mistakes in a 
copyright application do not prohibit a subsequent infringement 
action, and that Bouchat’s shield logo was entitled to copyright 
protection because it was sufficiently original.116 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the fourth certified 
question that raised the possibility that the lower court compelled a 
juror to reach a verdict by providing supplemental instructions and 
inquiring about the progress of the jury’s deliberations.117  The 
appellate court examined the circumstances surrounding the 
 
112 See id. at 354. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. at 357. 
Neither the fact that Bouchat incorporated public domain elements in his 
drawing (the letter B, a cross, a shield) nor the fact that he did not expressly 
indicate on his application that such elements rendered his authorship of the 
drawing derivative in nature, invalidate the protection to which his drawing is 
otherwise entitled under his valid copyright registration.  Accidental but 
harmless mistakes in a copyright application do not subsequently preclude an 
infringement action against an alleged copier. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
115 See id. 
116 See id. at 356–57. 
117 See id. at 357. 
The district court specifically told the jurors that it was not suggesting anyone 
surrender their honest convictions about the case.  The district court 
characterized its instructions as “fair and balanced,” and such a characterization 
is accurate.  The fact that the jurors were actively encouraged to persist in their 
effort to reach consensus does not mean that they were coerced. 
 Id. (citations omitted). 
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federal jury’s deliberations and concluded that the supplemental 
instructions and Allen charge118 given by the district court failed to 
constitute improper coercion.119  The Fourth Circuit held that no 
coercion existed when Judge Garbis encouraged the jury to persist 
in their endeavors toward reaching a verdict.120 
C. The Dissent 
United States Circuit Judge Robert Bruce King dissented at 
length.  He stated that the evidence presented did not substantiate 
an assumption that Bouchat’s faxed shield drawing reached Moag 
at his law firm and further argued that the “strikingly similar” 
doctrine was insupportable as a matter of law.121  Judge King 
indicated that he found the evidence too speculative to support a 
finding of access.122  Specifically, the dissent stated that Bouchat 
produced no direct evidence of copying and failed to produce 
sufficient evidence to show that Moag received the shield drawing 
or that Modell had access to it.123  Judge King argued that 
Bouchat’s evidence of access comprised “nothing more than a 
‘tortuous chain of hypothetical transmittals.’”124  The dissent found 
that Bouchat presented neither direct evidence that the defendants 
copied his drawing in creating the Ravens shield logo, nor proof 
that Modell or designers at the NFL office had even received the 
 
118 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896); United States v. McElhiney, 275 
F.3d 928, 935 (10th Cir. 2001) (“An Allen instruction is, in effect, a charge given by a 
trial court that encourages the jury to reach a unanimous verdict so as to avoid a 
mistrial.”); United States v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 433, 435 (4th Cir. 1961) (stating that, 
through an Allen charge, a trial court suggests “to jurors the desirability of agreement and 
avoidance of the necessity of a retrial before another jury”). 
119 See Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 357 (citing Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 41 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
120 See id. 
121 See id. at 358–59 (King, J., dissenting) (citing Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 
F.3d 715, 727 (4th Cir. 1999) (“We review de novo a district court’s denial of a Rule 
50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor.”)). 
122 See id. (King, J., dissenting) (citing Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 581–82 (4th Cir. 
1996)). 
123 See id. (King, J., dissenting). 
124 Id. at 358 (King, J., dissenting) (quoting Bouchet, 241 F.3d at 354 (citations 
omitted)). 
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plaintiff’s faxed drawing.125  Judge King disagreed with the 
majority’s conclusion that Bouchat had demonstrated access to his 
copyrighted works stating that the “majority’s inference-upon-
inference determination that Moag received Bouchat’s shield 
drawing is much too speculative to support a finding of access.”126 
Judge King alluded to irrefutable evidence that Moag’s office 
did not receive Bouchat’s logo and indicated that the MSA’s 
general practice of forwarding correspondence to Moag was 
simply inadequate to uphold a jury finding that Bouchat’s drawing 
actually reached Moag’s office.127  The dissent contended that even 
assuming that Bouchat’s drawing arrived at Moag’s office, 
Bouchat proffered no evidence to corroborate his assertion that 
Modell received the drawing.128  Judge King maintained that 
Bouchat had not established that the NFL Properties designers had 
a reasonable opportunity to view or copy Bouchat’s drawing.129  
Judge King pointed out that the United State District Court for the 
Southern District of New York often dealt with the bare corporate 
receipt doctrine and remained “steadfast in holding that access 
cannot permissibly be inferred from ‘bare corporate receipt.’”130  
Judge King stated that the majority’s holding “dismantles the 
access requirement by allowing a tenuous, unproved, contradicted, 
and inconsistent chain of inferences to satisfy Towler and prove 
access.”131 
 
125 See id. at 359 (King, J., dissenting). 
126 Id. at 360 (King, J., dissenting). 
127 See id. (King, J., dissenting).  The dissent contended that no one witnessed Bouchat 
faxing his shield drawing and no fax confirmation receipt or phone records were 
introduced at the trial.  In addition, Bouchat failed to proffer evidence that the MSA 
office received the fax. Id. (King, J., dissenting). 
128 See id. (King, J., dissenting).  Judge King noted that there was witness testimony 
from Moag, his secretary and the law firm’s manager, that no employee at MSA ever 
viewed the drawing. Id. (King, J., dissenting). 
129 See id. (King, J., dissenting). 
130 Id. at 363 (King, J., dissenting). See also Dimmie v. Carey, 88 F. Supp. 2d 142 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
131 Bouchet, 241 F.3d at 363–64 (King, J., dissenting). 
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Finally, Judge King criticized the majority for needlessly 
adopting the “strikingly similar” doctrine.132  According to the 
dissent, the doctrine “runs contrary to a fundamental principle of 
copyright protection: independent creation,” because the doctrine 
assumes that where two works are strikingly similar, there is a 
great possibility that one was derived from the other.133 
CONCLUSION 
After the Ravens had publicly unveiled their logo, Bouchat 
quickly filed for a copyright, nine months after he had allegedly 
created it.  To succeed in his copyright claim, Bouchat was 
obligated to prove that NFL Properties in New York had access to 
his drawings.  Bouchat’s claim of access relied heavily on a string 
of inferences that were deemed sufficient through the court’s 
adoption of the “strikingly similar” doctrine.  That opinion, 
however, includes Judge King’s fourteen-page dissent where he 
argued that the verdict was “entirely without legal or factual 
support.”134  Bouchat argued that the overlapping relationship of 
the intermediaries and their constant channels of communication 
established a jury question as to whether the defendants had copied 
his original works.  The Fourth Circuit agreed, and the jury verdict 
was upheld. 
Some would argue that the Bouchat court’s conclusion clearly 
conflicts with Towler.135  In Towler, the mere possibility of access 
was insufficient to prove copyright infringement.  In addition, the 
Towler court stated that a copyright plaintiff is required to present 
more than a “tortuous chain of hypothetical transmittals” and offer 
concrete evidence supporting the inference that the defendant 
 
132 See id. at 364 (King, J., dissenting).  The court had in fact rejected the doctrine in an 
earlier decision. Takeall v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 93-CV-1237, 1993 WL 509876 (4th Cir. 
Dec. 8, 1993). 
133 See Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 365 (King, J., dissenting) (quoting Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“If by some magic a man who 
had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 
‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of 
course copy Keats’s.”)). 
134 Bouchat, 241 F.3d at 365 (King, J., dissenting). 
135 See Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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received the allegedly infringed work.  Bouchat did not claim to 
have faxed his drawing to Modell or the artists at NFL Properties.  
Instead, Bouchat, absent any direct evidence, claimed that the 
disputed drawings found their way from the MSA to Moag’s 
office, to Modell, and finally to NFL Properties, Inc. where the 
artists there copied it. Bouchat’s contention and the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion could also be said to contradict the highly 
persuasive law of the Second Circuit in Gaste v. Kaiserman136 and 
the Seventh Circuit in Selle v. Gibb,137 prohibiting proof of access 
based on mere conjecture.  The Gaste court stated that “access 
must be more than a bare possibility and may not be inferred 
through speculation or conjecture.”138  Similarly, the Selle court 
asserted that “a plaintiff must always present sufficient evidence to 
support a reasonable possibility of access because the jury cannot 
draw an inference of access based upon speculation and conjecture 
alone.”139 
There is no simple rule concerning how much of a work may 
be taken before it rises to the level of infringement.  Apparently, 
the more a work is copied, the easier it is to show substantial 
similarity.  The Bouchat court, however, eliminated the need for 
access and adopted the rarely utilized “strikingly similar” doctrine 
to create an inference of access.  Thus, even though the Ravens 
disputed evidence of access and presented substantial evidence of 
independent creation, Bouchat’s copyright claim was successful. 
As stated in Judge King’s dissent, the majority’s decision 
directly jeopardizes the ability of the Fourth Circuit to dismiss 
cases that are not rationally found in fact.  Here, the determinative 
evidence of whether Modell had access to Bouchat’s shield 
drawings was deduced by unsupported inferences.  By upholding 
the jury’s verdict, the Fourth Circuit failed to assess the 
reasonableness of the evidence presented.  In doing so, the Bouchat 
court abandoned the copyright principle that a plaintiff must satisfy 
the burden of proof that the defendant had access to the allegedly 
infringed work.  The majority not only lowers the standard of proof 
 
136 863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988). 
137 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984). 
138 Gaste, 863 F.2d at 1066. 
139 Selle, 741 F.2d at 901. 
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of access, but for the first time embraces the “strikingly similar” 
doctrine.  This doctrine allows a plaintiff to prove copying absent 
proof other than the comparison of the two compositions.  The 
adoption of the “strikingly similar” doctrine signifies that evidence 
of lack of access and the independent creation of the allegedly 
infringing work, no matter how persuasive, can ultimately be 
discounted.  Under the majority’s opinion it seems that another 
person could follow Bouchat’s template and copy a commercial 
logo and then effectively file a suit against a business entity based 
exclusively on the similarities in the compositions and the person’s 
own testimony.  Such instances could leave deep-pocketed 
defendants quite vulnerable to frivolous and costly lawsuits. 
 
